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Conflict Prevention, Democracy Building and Common Security The role of the OSCE on the Eve of the New Millennium. Lecture by Ms. Helle Degn President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly At Utrikespolitiska Institutet, Stockholm, Tuesday 13 April
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Ladies and Gentlemen, These catchwords – conflict prevention, democracy building and common security, which I have chosen as the headline of this lecture, potentially represent not only three of the main aspects of the activities of the OSCE. Hopefully they may also represent a trend, an evolution from conflict towards co-operation aimed at ensuring the common security of the individual member states as well as their individual citizens. Soon after the start of this decade it became obvious that the fall of Soviet Union did not mean, that our part of the world had become a haven of peace and democracy. When conflicts and ethnic strife flared up for instance following the breakdown of former Yugoslavia, the main task of the OSCE became conflict prevention. After a difficult start the OSCE, notably under the Swedish Chairmanship in 1993, built up special capabilities, in particular in two phases of the conflict cycle, the early phase (early warning) and the late phase (post-conflict rehabilitation). In actual fact there is a measure of overlap between conflict prevention, in particular post-conflict rehabilitation, and another of the main tasks of OSCE, democracy building. This concept became one of the fundamental tasks of the OSCE through the document issued by the 1990 Paris Summit, The Charter of Paris for a New Europe. In this document the heads of state or government of the OSCE States undertook "to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of our nations." They added that "our States will co-operate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible." The background of these statements were the great achievements reached by the Organisation in the course of the year preceding the Paris Summit, notably the Copenhagen Document of June 1990, which at the time was aptly described as the bill of rights of the Europeans. These developments created an impressive body of commitments. The bulk of these commitments concerns the human dimension of the OSCE, i.e. provisions regarding democracy, human rights and the rule of law. To this day these commitments constitute the foundation of the moral authority of the OSCE. While conflict prevention is the primary responsibility of the Chairman-in-Office, other OSCE institutions have special tasks as to the human dimension commitments. This applies in particular to the ODIHR, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw and the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. van der Stoel, in The Hague. While the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly from 1991 of course deals with the whole range of the tasks of the Organisation Earlier in the decade the patient work of the OSCE for the promotion of democracy building was in a sense eclipsed by the more visible efforts in the field of conflict prevention. The last couple of years have, however, seen an intensification of the efforts of the OSCE for democracy building. This is also an expression of the fact that by and large the efforts of the OSCE in conflict prevention have been a success story. The present hostilities and human catastrophe in the Western Balkans should not be allowed to overshadow this fact. And indeed a lot of things might have been different if those in power in Belgrade had not chosen to expel the OSCE from Kosovo in 1993. It is well worth remembering that the mission in Kosovo set up in 1992 was the first OSCE long-term mission. The OSCE rather stumbled into creating this mission in response to criticism of various earlier fact finding missions whose brief presence in Kosovo had been followed by renewed repression. As the eyes and ears of the international community the Mission did a useful job of alleviating tensions. However, following the decision in 1993 to suspend Yugoslavia’s participation in the work of the Organisation because of its involvement in the war in Bosnia the Belgrade government reacted by refusing to allow the mission to continue its work. The initial success of the OSCE mission in Kosovo led to the establishment, also in 1992, of the second mission, the Spillover Mission in Skopje in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The name indicates that the aim of the mission was to prevent the conflicts in other parts of ex-Yugoslavia from spreading to Macedonia. In practice the main task of the Skopje mission has been to alleviate tensions between the Macedonian majority and the large minority of ethnic Albanians. After these beginnings, which, seen with the benefit of hindsight, were characterized by a pragmatic process of trial and error, it was quickly realized that with the long-term mission concept the OSCE had invented a very effective diplomatic tool. Moreover, this is a tool that is reasonably cheap as the mission members are seconded by their national governments. This means that the financial burden to a large extent falls on them rather than the Organization itself. The next years saw a rapid growth of the number of OSCE missions and a diversification of their tasks, which became widely different. Some missions were sent to areas that were characterized by actual or latent armed conflict, such as Tajikistan, Georgia and Chechnya. Others, such as the missions to Estonia and Latvia, are serving in peaceful surroundings. The tasks of the latter perhaps constitute conflict prevention in the most direct sense, as their main aim is to prevent the outbreak of potential conflicts by alleviating tensions between the majority populations and the large Russian-speaking minorities. The diversification of the tasks of the missions meant that some missions started to acquire tasks outside conflict prevention proper. The first instance was Georgia, whose state institutions had been ravaged by civil war, where a large human dimension component was included in the mission mandate. The decision as part of the Dayton accords in the autumn of 1995 to set up the OSCE Mission in Bosnia constituted a quantum leap. Previously established OSCE missions are small units comprising at most twenty members. The Bosnia Mission is a vastly bigger operation, which at its peak comprised about 300 members. At the same time its tasks were carefully delimited. Under the Dayton accords the OSCE, together with a number of other international organizations, acts so to speak as a sub-contractor of the international community represented by the Office of the High Representative. The main tasks of the Bosnia Mission are found within the human dimension, notably the management and supervision of national and municipal elections. Another difference from previously established OSCE missions is that its tasks mainly relate to post-conflict rehabilitation rather than the early phases of conflict prevention. Under the Danish Chairmanship in 1997 the OSCE got another large-scale mission when the mission to Croatia was expanded to comprise 250 members. This move was due to the fact that the OSCE took over important tasks from the United Nations to promote the integration of the Serb minority populations in Croatia. This was another task with a large human dimension component and also an operation that is aimed at post-conflict rehabilitation. The Danish Chairmanship brought other major new features in the development of the roles of the OSCE in conflict prevention. Following the breakdown of state authority in Albania in the spring of 1997 the OSCE took upon itself to play a co-ordinating role in close co-operation with other international actors, notably the European Union and the Council of Europe, in the efforts to pull the country back from chaos. The OSCE also did set up a mission in the country, the OSCE Presence in Albania, which among other things arranged for the supervision of the elections for a new parliament. In contrast to previous OSCE operations, which have been taking place in areas characterized by ethnic strife, it should be noted that the OSCE now undertook a major role in a crisis where ethnic differences were not the defining factor. Finally, in a somewhat similar vein, the Danish Chairmanship, as one of its last achievements, and as the result of its efforts to resolve the constitutional crisis created by President Lukashenko’s efforts to concentrate power in his own hands, won acceptance from the Belarus authorities to set up a mission of a new type in that country, the Advisory and Monitoring Group. This body was the first mission whose mandate exclusively consists of democracy building. Further developments over the last couple of years comprise the setting-up of OSCE Centres in the three Central Asian OSCE States where the OSCE did not already have resident missions (Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan). The tasks of the three new missions comprise a large human dimension component. In the autumn of 1998 the largest venture of the OSCE so far, the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission, was set up, comprising 1400 members. While the hostilities in Kosovo have meant that the KVM has had to be evacuated, the plans for a solution to the Kosovo crisis worked out at the Rambouillet Conference foresee an even larger role for the OSCE, which would be given primary responsibility for civilian administration in Kosovo. There is no doubt that the OSCE missions constitute the most original and one of the most important of the instruments in the toolbox of the OSCE. Over the years the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has striven to support the activities of the missions. I have made this endeavour one of the main priorities of my term as the President of the Assembly. So far I have visited eight OSCE missions and I hope to visit two more before the next meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly in July in Saint Petersburg. In this way I am gaining first hand impression of the efforts of the OSCE missions and the large and vastly different challenges which the Organisation is facing in the various mission areas. At the same time these visits provide me with an opportunity for increasing the visibility of the OSCE by calling attention to the importance of the activities of the Organisation. As I have already mentioned, it may be difficult to draw a clear line between the conflict prevention and democracy building activities of the OSCE. In the words of the Document adopted by the OSCE Summit in Helsinki in 1992 "this concept relates maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights." It is therefore only reasonable that over the last years democracy building has come to play an increasingly important role in the work of most missions. At the same time there has been a trend towards intensifying the other efforts of the OSCE in the field of democracy building as well as rendering them more concrete. Perhaps the most useful development has been that the ODIHR has changed the focus of its work from the arrangement of meetings to undertaking concrete projects in the field in those OSCE countries where democracy building is most needed. I would remiss in my task if I did not also touch upon the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. van der Stoel, in The Hague. Technically speaking, Mr. van der Stoel’s efforts are regarded as conflict prevention rather than democracy building. His job is not to act as the ombudsman of national minorities and his brief does not include individual cases. His task is to prevent the outbreak of ethnic strife. He conducts his work on an independent basis and his main activities are not readily visible, as he conducts his work using quiet, personal diplomacy. Nevertheless Mr. van der Stoel’s efforts are very much appreciated as one of the real success stories of the work of the OSCE. His work has undoubtedly made a decisive contribution to defuse and alleviate a number of potentially dangerous minority situations. In this way Mr. van der Stoel’s efforts have also contributed significantly to democracy building in the OSCE area. If we stand back for a brief moment to take a general look at the efforts of the OSCE for conflict prevention and democracy building, it can be said in all fairness that both fields are characterised by vigorous developments. This means that the Organisation is expanding and improving the effectiveness of its operations. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that it will have its hands full with tasks of the present types well into the 21st century. The Balkans and some of the areas of the former Soviet Union, notably the Caucasus and Central Asia, are obviously areas where the largest problems persist and, at the present time and it is obvious that it is of common interest to the OSCE States that these problems are addressed. On the other hand the concentration of the efforts of the Organisation on a limited number of countries in the periphery of the OSCE area may, over time, lead to the loss of interest in the OSCE among the general public, and very likely also the decision-makers, of the more fortunate parts of the OSCE area. It is in this context that the work of the OSCE on a Charter for European Security acquires special importance. This is a task that include all memberstates and spans a long time frame." At the outset the Russian/Budapest initiative was met with widespread scepticism. It was obviously linked to other Russian moves to prevent the eastwards expansion of NATO and to give the OSCE primary responsibility for security in Europe. Gradually, however, an increasing number of OSCE States have taken the view that, irrespective of the Russian intentions, the momentum created by this initiative could and should be used. There was – and still is - a need to lay down guidelines for a co-operative relationship between the OSCE and the various other international organisations dealing with aspects of security in the OSCE area, such as NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe and the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States) as well as the many new sub-regional groupings which have sprung up in post-cold war Europe. Against that background it was decided at the OSCE Summit in Lisbon in 1996, again prompted by a Russian proposal, that on the basis of the work on the Security Model the OSCE should consider a Charter on European Security. It must be kept in mind that a number of OSCE States continue to take a sceptical approach to the charter concept. This is to some extent still due to the origins of the concept. In addition some East European countries without immediate prospects of entering the EU and NATO fear that the Charter might be used to offer them a second-class substitute solution to their security concerns. In my view the OSCE it self has, a lot to gain from the successful completion of the work on the Security Charter. First of all, the Document will identify and express the new challenges we see to European security in the post-Cold War era and how they can be dealt with. Secondly, it will set out the new tasks that the Organisation will be ready to undertake to ensure peace and stability in the OSCE area. Thirdly, it will set guidelines for co-operation with other relevant security organizations and make certain that any combined activity produces the best results possible. Fourthly, it will reaffirm the paramount importance of the respect for the OSCE principles and commitments. While work on the Security Model before the 1996 Lisbon Summit had been principally devoted to conceptual and procedural exploration of the task, the Danish Chairmanship in 1997 gradually managed to bring discussions on the Security Charter into a more operational mode. Step by step it was accepted that negotiations would have to address three main elements.
The decision to hold the next OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999 has, however, put the negotiators under time pressure. At the OSCE Ministerial Council in Oslo in December 1998 it was decided to complete the work in the course of 1999. On this basis the present Norwegian Chairmanship has set out a working plan in three phases. In the first phase, which is finishing at this time, it is the aim to find out in which areas disagreements persist. In the second phase until the summer break in July work is scheduled to concentrate on the drafting of the Charter. Finally a third phase, the period between August and November, the run-up to the Istanbul Summit, is set aside for the endgame, the final negotiations and the completion of the Document. From the very beginning the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has been actively involved in the work on the Security Model and the Charter on European Security. In recognition of the importance of the subject matter, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly chose to make the Security Model the central theme of its Fifth Annual Session in Stockholm in July 1996, and of the Declaration adopted at the end of that session. On this basis, the Parliamentary Assembly submitted a number of recommendations for the Lisbon Summit later that year. In one of the most important ones, the parliamentarians, continuing a policy which we have been steadfastly pursuing since 1994, called upon the OSCE to abandon the existing rigid version of the consensus decision-making system and to replace it by what we have called "approximate consensus." The consensus principle is regarded as one of the hallmarks of the OSCE. Unfortunately, under the present rigid and doctrinaire version of the consensus requirement the opposition of just one OSCE State is needed to block practically all decisions. This system, which dates back to the times of the Cold War. Under "appropriate concensus" this rule decisions could be taken with the agreement of OSCE States which would equal 90 percent of both membership and financial contributions. If this rule was accepted, no single nation could block OSCE action and any decision taken by the organization would still carry the backing of the vast majority of its members. It is the firm opinion of the Parliamentary Assembly that a modification of the consensus principle along these lines would greatly increase the effectiveness of the OSCE. In another recommendation from the 1996 Stockholm Session, which is well worth recalling, the Parliamentary Assembly agreed that failure by the OSCE States to honour their OSCE principles and commitments should be subjected to sanctions beyond political declarations alone. This, in itself, could exert a deterrent effect on would-be violators and would address the commonly cited shortcoming that the OSCE has no enforcement powers. It is interesting to note that by this move the parliamentarians actually were the first to launch ideas with a similar aim as the concept of assistance to OSCE States with the implementation of their commitments, to which I referred previously. During my term as the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly I have made this endeavour one of the priorities of my work. When I addressed the Permanent Council last October, I called attention to the outcome of the 1996 Stockholm Session. At the same time I noted that "the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly can contribute to the advancement of the platform concept by fostering closer co-operation with the parliamentary assemblies of other relevant organisations, including the Council of Europe and NATO." It is also primarily with a view to the final negotiations in Vienna on the Security Charter that we have decided that the central theme of the forthcoming Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly next July in Saint Petersburg will be "Common Security and Democracy in the 21st Century." This wording will give the participating parliamentarians ample opportunities to take stock of the results so far achieved in the Charter negotiations and, in particular, to influence the course of the concluding negotiations and thereby the content of the Document which will be the guidelines for OSCE into the 21.century will be adopted at the Istanbul Summit. |
